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Abstract- A method is presented for process 
fault diagnosis using information from fault tree 
analysis and uncertainty / imprecision of data. 
Fault tree analysis, which has been used as a 
method of system reliability / safety analysis, 
provides a procedure for identifying failures 
within a process. A fuzzy fault diagnostic system 
is constructed which uses the fuzzy fault tree 
analysis to represent a knowledge of the causal 
relationships in process operation and control 
system. The proposed method is applied 
successfully to a nitric acid cooler process plant. 
1 Introduction 
Fault tree analysis is useful for system 
reliability analysis and risk quantification since 
which illustrates the failure logic of a system, 
and shows combinations and sequences of failure 
which can lead to a failure condition under 
consideration (the top event). The fault 
diagnostic expert system is developed which uses 
fault tree analysis for representation and 
acquisition of knowledge from the process 
operation and control system[l-4]. For many 
systems, estimation of qualitative / quantitative 
information from fault tree analysis is difficult 
due to uncertainty and imprecision of 
information about process malfunction. 
In  this paper, we use fuzzy set logic to 
account for imprecision and uncertainty in 
information and data while employing fault tree 
analysis. Qualitative information of fault tree 
analysis, i.e. minimal cut sets from a fault tree, is 
transformed into the knowledge base in the form 
of production rules. Quantitative information 
which obtained by fuzzy fault tree analysis is 
used to determine the certainty factors and 
stored in the knowledge base. The fuzzy fault 
diagnostic system can identify component 
failures and process disturbances which can lead 
to system malfunctions by matching the process 
uncertainty data from the plant with the pattern 
of IF statements stored in the computers. From 
the uncertainty detected data and knowledge, the 
system also evaluates certainty factors of 
component failures and process disturbances for 
sequence checking in diagnosis. A nitric acid 
cooler process plant is used to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed method. 
2 Fault tree for nitric acid cooler process 
A nitric acid cooler process with 
temperature feedback and pump shutdown 
feedforward loops is illustrated in Fig.l[5]. The 
function of this process is to cool a hot nitric 
acid stream before reacting it with Benzene to 
form Nitrobenzene. Numbers 1-14 in circles in 
the plant of Fig.1 show nodes which are the 
connecting points of components. The following 
notation is used to describe deviations in process 
variables at nodes: T, F, P( AP) denote deviations 
in temperature, flow rate and pressure 
respectively. Hence, to represent an increase in 
the flow rate at node7, write F7 high. The 
undesired event for the system is a high 
temperature in the nitric acid reactor feed since 
this could cause a reactor runaway. In this 
study, T4 high (high temperature in the effluent 
stream of nitric acid) is selected as the top event. 
Fig.2 shows the fault tree of the process for the 
top event (T4 high). 
Process variables in the fault tree of Fig.2 
can be divided into two groups: A type and B 
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type. The A type such as too high, high, normal, 
low and too low is used to describe disturbances 
in the process. Too high, too low denote large 
deviations in the high, low direction respectively 
which can not be corrected by a control loop, 
and high, low denote deviations which can be 
corrected. The B type such as more, less is used 
to discribe deviations which occured in a control 
loop and protective system. More, less denote no 
signal to cancel the effect of deviations in the 
process variables, and normal denotes a 
standard state. 
3 Knowledge representation and acquisition 
Fault tree analysis is used for the 
representation and acquisition of knowledge 
from the process operation and control system. 
The fault propagation in process is modeled by 
causal relationships from the qualitative 
information, i.e. a fault tree and it's minimal cut 
sets. The method can determine the minimum 
number of sensors and the monitoring points to 
detect basic events in the process[3]. Table1 
shows twenty-two minimal cut sets of the fault 
tree, and the allocation of twelve sensors in 
circles is illustrated in Fig.1, such as flow sensor 
F2 for F2 more and F2 high and F2 too high, 
temperature sensor T2 for "2 high and T2 too 
high, pressure sensor P10 for P10 less and P10 
Cooling water A 
Hat nitric acid Cold nitric acid 
Fig.1 Nitric acid cooler process and 
(Inlet) sensor allocation for diagnosis 
A 
Iwronrors operation of ronhol system] 
Fig.2 Fault t ree  of n i t r i c  acid cooler process for  T4 hi& 
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low, and so on. 
Based on the minimal cut sets for the nitric 
Table 1 Minimal cut sets of fault tree 
cutmet (13J17,231). 
C U ~ D C ~  (14,[17,241). 
acid cooler process, the qualitative information 
can be transformed into production rules. For 
example, the cutset(5,[6,10]) shows that a 
disturbance and a failure of shutdown system 
could cause T4 high. The disturbance (Water 
Table 2 Failure rates of basic events 
and subjective estimation factors 
Qas.ikation Erml nvmhrn B u L  event FaiLlrt n ( c  K 
DUturbmcr 4 
6 
15 
17 
37 
39 
/* **e** R u m  FO-mONS *******. xp8 A p 8  e**** */ 
Rulem: 
IF T3 is normal, THEN The system is running on w d l ~ .  
Rule01 (CF-mIe is 0.155): 
IF T3 is high & F2 is more & P5 is not-low & P6 is low & PI1 is less & P12 is less, TAEN Pump is shutdown & Shudown-system is hilure. 
RuleCQ (CF-Nle is 0.268): 
IF T3 is high & F2 is more & PS b not-low & P6 is low & PI1 is less & PI2 is not-less, THEN Pump is shutdmn & (Tubel is leak or plugged). 
RuleU3 (CF-rule is 0.159): 
IF T3 is high & IQ is more & P5 is not-low & P6 is low & PI1 is not-less, THEN Pump is shutdown & PV is hilure. 
Rule04 (CF-rule is 0.152): 
IF T3 is high & F1 
RuleQS (CF-mle is 0.246): 
IF T3 is high & F2 is more & PS is low & P6 is low & PI1 is less & PI2 is not-less, TAEN Water is low_inpul& Wubel is leak or plugged). 
Rule06 (CF-mle is 0.159: 
IF T3 is high & F2 is more & PS U low & P6 is low & PI1 is not-kss, THEN Water is low-input & PV is failure. 
~ u l e ( n  (CF-rule is 0.174): 
IFT3 is high & F2 is high & F7 is less &xpBis less & P10is less, THEN F1 is h i  & TS is failure. 
Rule08 (Cl-mle is 0.1%): 
IFT3 is high& F2 is high & F7 is less & #PSisnot-ks & P1Ois less, THEN F1 is high & TC is failure. 
Rule09 (CF-Nle is 0.163): 
IFT3 is high & IQir high & F7 is less & PI0 isnot-less, THEN F1 is high & FCV is failure. 
Rule10 (CF-rule is 0.16% 
IFT3 is high & TZ is high & F7 is less & #P8 is less & PlO is less, THEN TI is h i h  & TS is failure. 
Rule11 (CF-mle is 0.186): 
IFT3 is high & TZ is high & F7 is less & #P8 is not-less & PI0 is less, THEN Tl is high & TC is failure. 
IFT3 
more & PS is low & P6 is low & PI1 is less & P12 is less, THEN Water is low-input & Shudown-system is failure. 
RuleU (CF-Nle is 0.158): 
high & TZ b high & F7 is less & P1Ok not-less, THEN Tl is high & FCV is failure. 
RuleU (CF-mle is 0.186): 
Rule14 (CF-mle is 0.194): 
Rule15 (CF-Nle is 0.15T): 
Rule16 (CF-Nle is 0.172): 
Rule17 (CF-Nle is 0316): 
IF T3 is high & F7 is low & #P8 is low & P9 is low & PI0 is low, THEN TS is low-output 
IF T3 U high & F7 is lor & #P8 not-low & P9 is low & P10 b lor & P14 is not-low, THEN TC is low-output. 
IF T3 is high & W 
IF T3 is high & F7 ir low & P9 is low & PI0 is not-low, THEN Tube2 is leak or Tube2 is plugged. 
IF T3 is high & F7 is low & P9 is nor-low, THEN FCV is dosed. 
low & P9 is Im & PI0 is low & P14 is low, THEN AIR is low-input. 
Rule18 (CF-Nle is 0310): 
IFn is high & F2 is m-hi THEN m ism-high. 
Rule19 (CF-Nle is 0378): 
IFT3 is high & TL is bo-high TEEN Tl is m-high Fig3 Knowledge base about T4 high for diagnosis 
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low-input) will occur if cooling water pressure 
P6 and P5 are observed to be low both. And the 
shutdown systen failure will be find by that 
pressure P11, P12 are known to be less and flow 
rate F2 to be more. Also the top event (T4 high) 
will be found if temperature T3 is known to be 
high. This one can be transformed into a 
production rule as shown below. 
IF 
THEN Water is low-input & 
Shutdown-system is failure 
The production rules which are obtained in the 
same way are shown in Fig.3. Besides, we can 
deduce a component failure, such as Event13 
(PV failure) in Fig.2 will occur, from the 
exclusive information of Event8 (P11 is less), and 
write this information in IF statement of rules as 
P11 is not-less. 
T3 is high & F2 is more & P5 is low & 
P6 is low & P11 is less & P12 is less 
cF-*k(')=' 
4 Fuzziness in  rules 
T(fi ,  f z ) ,  %=El & E2 
S(f1, f z ) ,  x=El or E2 
. Wl, SVZ, f 3 h  
An imprecision of component failure or 
process disturbance can be described by using 
the failure rate and the subjective estimation 
factor. We call it a fuzzy failure measure, and 
give it by 
1 
, o< 151 
1 t(K*log(l/ R ))3 
f l R ,  K)= (1) In R =o 
where, I is a failure rate of component shown 
in Table2 for the nitric acid cooler process[V, 
and K is a parameter which called a subjective 
estimation factor. The more smaller of K, the 
more stronger of evaluation for failure rate. The 
value of K for the process is also shown in 
Table2. 
When THEN statement in production rules 
are composed of two basic events with logical 
multiply or logical sum, we will use the fuzzy 
failure measure f I , f z to describe the fuzziness 
of multiply with a t-norm of Dombi's type[S]: 
1 
0, f1=0, w fz=O (2) 
Given a t-norm T one can consider the dual of 
T(called a t-conorm) defined by 
SVi, f*)=I-T(I- f i ,  1-f~) 
[ [ " ] " [ L j 3 ] " ~  
1-fl 1 - f z  
0 5 f 1 ,  f z < l  
f 1 =1, w f2 =I (3) 
where, E is the members of THEN statement in 
a rule, such as EI=Pump is shutdown, E2=Tubel 
is leaking, E3=Tubel is plugged for Rule02 in 
F i g 3  
From above equations and data in Table2, 
a result of CF-rule is obtained for the nitric acid 
cooler process plant, and stored in knowledge 
base as shown Fig.3. 
5 Fuzziness in  process variables 
We can consider a process variable in fault 
tree as a fuzzy set. Uncertainty about process 
variables, which detected from sensor readings, 
is dealt with through membership functions, and 
transformed to certainty factors of sensor 
readings. The shape and relation for these fuzzy 
sets with process variables appear as Fig.4[9]. 
A negation of process variable, such as P5 
is not-low, is represented by a I -fuzzy set 
complement p not-A(X), and give the set by 
(5) 
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Table3 shows an example of sensor 
readings at twelve monitoring points. We can 
calculate certainty factors of process variables by 
the membership functions and sensor readings, 
and result in Table3. From the fuzziness of 
process variables, certainty factors about IF 
statements in knowledge base will be determined. 
6 Fault diagnosis 
............... 
high 
............... 
high or normal 
- normal - 
normal or low 
low 
Process variables 
*ZO ................ 
more 
110 ................ 
% 
d 
- 
moreorMnma1 
- normal - p ' 
G 
normal or lerr 
10 
less 
20 
Process variables 
(b) 
0 O S  L O  
Membership funclions 
I 
-7- - 
0 5  I O  
Membership Junclioni 
The fuzzy expert system attempts to 
identify the component failures and process 
disturbances which can lead to system 
malfunction by searching through the IF  
statements of rules in Fig3 corresponding to 
process data from the plant such as sensor 
readings in Table3. The pattern recognition in 
inference engine is completed by means of which 
a pruduction rule will fire through certainty 
factor in IF statement of the rule. Assume a IF 
statement having N members with C F j v ( l ) ,  
C F g v ( 2 ) ,  .... C F ~ V ( N ) ,  the certainty factor in 
the IF statement can be presented in the form: 
CF-if=CF-#v( 1) ACF $242) A .  .. ACF pu(N) (6) 
For example, using the values of C F g v  for 
sensor readings in Table3, six rules (RuleOl- 
Rule06) would fire and infer that T4 high could 
result from the disturbance and the pump 
shutdown feadfonvard loop failure. In turns, the 
expert system identify the positive causes in 
THEN statements which are composed of 
component failures and disturbances, and 
reasoning results are shown in Table4. 
Table 4 Reasoning results for the example 
Fig.4 Membership functions 
((a) for A type and (b) for B type) 
Table 3 Example of nensor readings and uncertainly 
C.rl.lnly f.rtor 
N o .  Sensor r e . d i o g " - - - r t y p .  ~ B t Y P P  
HIGH NORMAL LOW MORE NORMAI. LFSS- 
I F2'9.0 0.80 0.20 0.90 0.10 
2 72-5 .0  1.W 
3 T3'10.5 1.W 
4 P5=-6.5 0.70 0.30 
5 P6=-9.5 0.10 0.90 
6 F7.0.0 1.W 1 . W  
7 m - 0 . 0  1.W 1.00 
R p9=0.0 1.W 
9 PI0:o.o 1.00 1.00 
10 Pll=-8.5 0.10 0.70 0.15 O.85 
I I  P l 2 = - 2 . 5  1.00 0.75 0.25 
12 P14=5.0 1.00 
U Nr P-itive c l u w  CF-if C i - d  CF-I&= ChPeL M No. 
~. 
01 PuraplhutdDvn 
02 Pvmplhutdarn 
03 Pvmplhutdan 
&Shutdown-qltemfdLm 0.25 0.155 0.0388 3 
&Tubellenkorpluped 0.65 0.268 0.1742 1 
& P V f i i h m  0.124 0.159 0.01'3 5 
W W . 0  bx-inpuf 
& S h u t d a n _ q n O p m h  0.25 0.152 0.0380 4 
LTubelkakorpluped 0.30 0.246 0.0738 2 
& PV hilure 0.124 0.155 0.0192 6 
m w~~~~- .x_inpuf  
06 wm0lox_input 
Finally, sequence checking in diagnosis for 
complex positive causes is carry out in the expert 
system through evaluating certainty factors of 
THEN statements for fired rules by a 
multiplication. 
CFdhen=CFjf * C F n l e  (7) 
A checking sequence as same example for 
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nitric acid cooler process is also appeared on 
Table4. As a result of diagnosis using fault tree 
analysis and certainty factors, the system can 
successfully diagnose any single or multiple 
faults in the plant. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, a fuzzr fault diagnostic 
system is developed which uses fuzzy set logic to 
accout for uncertainty in information and data 
while employing fault tree analysis. Qualitative 
information, minimal cut sets, of fault tree 
analysis is used for the representation and 
acquisition of knowledge, and transformed into 
production rules. Fuzziness in rules is 
determined based on a fuzzy failure measure, a 
t-norm, a t-conorm, and stored in knowledge 
base as certainty factors. As demonstrated, the 
positive causes of system failure can be identified 
effectively by reasoning through process 
uncertainty data from the plant and production 
rules. A checking sequence for complex positive 
causes in diagnosis is evaluated from certainty 
factors of THEN statements for fired rules. 
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